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Abstract— It is the fact that wireless local area networks are 
increasingly deployed by businesses, government and SOHO 
users as they offer many advantages to its customers with 
mobility, flexibility, convenience etc. It opened a wide range of 
new commercial areas for hardware vendors, at low cost. This 
justifies why wireless networks have become one of the most 
widely used communication systems in the world. However, since 
there are no boundaries in wireless networks, they are vulnerable 
to security threats than wired networks. Therefore, providing 
secure communication for wireless networks has become one of 
the prime concerns.  Quantum cryptography, to be precise, 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), offers the promise of 
unconditional security. In this paper, we extend our previous 
research work of how QKD can be used in IEEE 802.11 wireless 
networks to ensure secure key distribution. Our contributions in 
this paper are as follows: (1) We discussed how QKD can be used 
in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks to securely distribute the keys. 
(2) We use new protocol QKD. (3) We introduced a method that 
take the advantage of mutual authentication features offered by 
some EAP variants of 802.1X Port-Based Network Access 
Control. (4) Finally, we present a new code called Quantum 
Message Integrity Code (Q-MIC) which provides mutual 
authentication between the two communication parties. Also 
experimental results are presented with Simulink Model. 
 
Keywords-quantum key distribution (QKD), wireless 
communication, IEEE 802.11X, security system 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Wireless communication has gone through rapid 
advancements during the last few decades, an increasing 
number of government agencies, businesses and home users 
are either using, or considering using, wireless technologies in 
their environments [24]. Therefore wireless networks are 
becoming ubiquitous in homes, offices and enterprises with its 
ability to provide high-speed, high-quality information 
exchange between portable devices. It is obvious that in the 
near future wireless technology will dominate the 
communication industry. While wireless networks and its 
applications are becoming popular every day, security issues 
associated with it have become a great concern. Due to the 
nature of wireless communications, it is possible for an attacker 
to snoop on confidential communications or modify them to 
gain access to the wireless networks more easily than with 
wired networks. In this paper we are going to make a novel 
method to create an implementation of quantum cryptography 
for key distribution in 802.11 networks. 
This paper comprises of 8 sections. In this section we 
provide some introduction to wireless security, quantum 
cryptography and discuss advantages of using Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD) in wireless networks. Section 2 gives some 
background to IEEE 802.11i standard, including 4-way 
handshake, key hierarchy and IEEE 802.1X authentication. 
Both sections 1 and 2 only provides details with respect to 
exploit the facts on how QKD can integrate with the 802.11 
networks. Section 3 describes the proposed new protocol 
merging QKD with 802.11 wireless networks. Section 4 
provides the details of the protocol implementation. In section 
5 talks about future related research works. The last three 
sections, sections 6, 7 and 8 are for Acknowledgements, 
Conclusions, and References respectively. 
As wireless communications use the airwaves, they are 
intrinsically more vulnerable to interceptions and attacks than 
its wired counterparts. As the service become more popular, 
the risks to users of wireless technology have increased 
significantly. Thus, there are a great number of security risks 
associated with the current wireless protocols and encryption 
methods [6, 8]. Some of the common types of attacks against 
wireless networks are: Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Identity 
theft (MAC spoofing), Man-in-the-middle attacks, ARP 
poisoning, Network injection etc.  
Based on the laws of physics, quantum cryptography allows 
exchange of cryptographic key between two remote parties 
with unconditional security. The foundation of quantum 
cryptography lies in the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, 
which states that certain pairs of physical properties are related 
in such a way that measuring one property prevents the 
observer from simultaneously knowing the value of the other. 
So that, act of an eavesdropper intercepting a photon will 
irretrievably change the information encoded on that photon, 
thereby detecting any security breach. It uses quantum states of 
photons to transfer cryptographic key material. 
The classical public-key cryptography uses asymmetric 
keys, with one that is private and another one that is public. 
During the encryption process, the sending station uses a public 
key to encrypt the data before transmission. The receiving 
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station uses the matching private key to decrypt the data upon 
reception. Each station keeps their private key hidden in order 
to avoid compromising encrypted information. In addition, to 
protecting information from hackers, stations can use public 
key cryptography to authenticate themselves to other stations 
or access points. The major weakness of this classical public-
key cryptography is based on the fact that the private key is 
always linked mathematically to the public key [14]. Due to 
this reason, it is always possible to attack a public-key system 
if the eavesdroppers equipped with sufficiently large 
computational resources. Therefore, the mathematical problem 
to derive the private key from public key must be as difficult as 
possible. Hence those systems cannot provide any indication of 
eavesdropping or guarantee of key security. 
Hence it is clear that the main problem of secret or public-
key cryptography is secure distribution of keys.  This is where 
the quantum mechanics offers a solution. Quantum 
cryptography provides “unconditional security” in key 
distribution.  In contrast to traditional public-key cryptography, 
which relies on the computational difficulty of certain 
mathematical functions, the security of quantum cryptography 
relies on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Quantum 
cryptography exploits the fundamental laws of quantum 
physics where nobody can measure a state of an arbitrary 
polarized photon carrying information without introducing 
disturbances. Classical key distribution can always be passively 
monitored, without the legitimate users being aware that any 
eavesdropping has taken place. Whereas in quantum 
mechanics, any projective measurement will induce 
disturbances hence eavesdropping can be detected. Due to this 
reason, use of QKD in wireless key distribution will provide 
huge advantage with respect to data security. 
Quantum cryptography is only used to produce and 
distribute a key, known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), 
but not to transmit any message data. Several QKD protocols 
such as BB84 [7], B92 [20] and six-state [18] exist as of now. 
Out of those, BB84 is more popular and widely used in 
practical networks [25]. We have chosen a variation of BB84 
called SARG04 (Scarani, Acin, Ribordy, and Gisin) [21] to use 
in our work. SARG04 is robust against photon-number 
splitting (PNS) attacks [21, 22]. 
QKD has gone through significant advancements in both 
optical and wireless networks. There are lots of research work 
in progress in this area and even commercial QKD networks 
exited as of now [17, 19, 26, 27, 28]. In QKD, the transmitter 
(Alice) sends the key as a series of polarized photons via 
quantum channel towards the receiver (Bob).  
Bob measures these photons using randomly selected bases 
to generate his version of the key. Once the photon 
transmission is over, the rest of the communication takes place 
in public channel (eg: internet, wireless medium). This 
communication is split into 4 main stages: Sifting, error 
estimation, reconciliation and privacy amplification. These 4 
stages help Alice and Bob to recover identical with 
“unconditionally” secure key to be used for the subsequent data 
encryption.  
 
II. IEEE 802.11I STARNDARD 
IEEE 802.11 [2] specifies an over-the-air interface between 
client and base station or between two wireless clients. IEEE 
802.11i [3], an amendment to 802.11, describes two new 
confidentiality algorithms, namely, Temporal Key Integrity 
Protocol (TKIP) and Counter-mode/CBC-MAC Protocol 
(CCMP) respectively [12]. IEEE 802.11i separates the 
authentication and encryption key management.  For 
authentication 802.11i uses IEEE 802.1X [4] and pre-shared 
key. 
IEEE 802.1X offers an effective framework for 
authenticating, managing keys and controlling user traffic to 
protect large networks. It employs the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [13] to allow a wide variety of 
authentication mechanisms.  
802.1X authentication process happen between three main 
elements. The user or the client that wants to be authenticated 
is known as Supplicant or Station. The actual server doing the 
authentication is called Authentication Server (eg: RADIUS, 
DIAMETER). The Authenticator or the Access Point allows 
only the supplicants who are authorized by the authentication 
server to gain access to the network.   
At the end of IEEE 802.1X authentication, the Supplicant 
and Authentication Server generate a shared key called 
Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The Authentication Server then 
transmits PMK to the Authenticator through a secure channel 
(eg: TLS). This PMK is used to derive Pairwise key hierarchy 
through an exchange of IEEE 802.1X EAPOL-Key frames, 
often called as 4-Way Handshake in the IEEE 802.11 standard. 
Figure 1 shows the Pairwise key hierarchy [3].  The PMK 
received from the Authentication Server during 802.1X 
authentication is used to generate PTK by applying Pseudo 
Random Function (PRF). The PTK gets divided into three 
keys. The first key is the EAPOL-key confirmation key (KCK). 
The KCK is used by the EAPOL-key exchanges to provided 
data origin authenticity. KCK is also used to calculate Message 
Integrity Code (MIC).  The second key is the EAPOL-key 
encryption key (KEK). The KEK is used by the EAPOL-key 
exchanges to provide for confidentiality. KEK is used to 
encrypt the Group Temporal Key (GTK). The third key is the 
Temporal Key (TK), which is used by the data-confidentiality 
protocols to encrypt unicast data traffic. 
 
 
Figure 1: Pairwise Key Hierarchy of IEEE 802.11i 




Figure 2: 4-way Handshake 
As described in section 1.1, wireless networks are subject 
to various security risks. Exchanging data over a wireless 
network must be done with great care because traffic 
interceptions in wireless networks are much easier. Therefore, 
in order to provide privacy for the users, it is essential to 
authenticate users with the network elements. Although there 
are lots of research works happening to improve this daunting 
task of providing secure data communication to its users, they 
are still subject to security attacks. Quantum cryptography or 
QKD is one area which did not get much attention in wireless 
networks so far with regards to security. 
III.  PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
Out of many different varieties of wireless networks such 
as GSM, GPRS, CDMA, UMTS etc, the coverage offered by 
Wi-Fi networks is only in the range of 100 meters. Wi-Fi 
networks are very popular in places like coffee shops, air ports, 
conference halls etc. As our main focus is to offer secured key 
distribution in wireless networks using QKD, we found that 
IEEE 802.11i family (Wi-Fi) best suits to marry with QKD.  
The environmental conditions impacting quantum 
transmissions in Wi-Fi networks can be minimized as the 
coverage area is very small. 
The overall communication of this new protocol takes place 
in two channels: Wireless Channel (Wi-Fi and Quantum 
Channel.  
 From the point onwards the SARG04 quantum key 
distribution process takes place as shown in flows 3 - 6 of 
Figure 3. As the first step, the transmission switches over to the 
Quantum Channel. Supplicant then sends series of photons 
towards the Authenticator. Authenticator keeps track of all the 
photons that it received along with the bases it used to measure 
the photons. As soon as the photon transmission finishes, the 
Wireless Channel resumes for the rest of the protocol 
execution. 
As briefly discussed in section 1.3, the keys obtained by 
both parties will contain errors due to various atmospheric 
conditions, eavesdropping etc. The subsequent 3 stages of 
QKD remove all these errors in order to obtain the final 
secured key.  The Sifting process (flow 3 of figure 4) removes 
all the bits which recorded against incorrect bases used by the 
Authenticator. The Error Correction process (flow 4 of figure 
3) determines the amount of errors discovered during the 
transmission. If this error level in within the threshold level, the 
communication continues.  
To achieve this, the quantum transmission should ensure to 
send sufficient number of photons in order to recover Q-Key at 
least equal or greater than the PMK. For CCMP, PTK is 256 
bits, while TKIP occupies 384 bits for PMK. Therefore, at this 
stage, we strip any extra bits of Q-Key so that it will have same 
length as PTK. We get this stripped Q-Key as the PTK. Once 
PTK is available, we can retrieve the key hierarchy containing 
all other keys using the PRF as described in section 2.2. 
 
Figure 3: The Proposed Protocol 
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 From PTK, we can derive KEK, KCK and TK, while from 
KCK, MIC can be calculated. We use this MIC in our 
subsequent protocol messages to implement mutual 
authentication. At this stage, Supplicant performs XOR 
operation with the MIC and the first set of bits of equal length 
in PMK. We call this resulted MIC as Quantum MIC (Q-MIC).   
 
Q-MIC = (MIC) XOR (first bits of PMK equivalent  
                                       to the length of MIC) 
 
Supplicant then sends Q-MIC to Authenticator as shown in 
flow 7 of Figure 3. Upon receiving Q-MIC, Authenticator 
verifies the Q-MIC. Since the Authenticator is in possession of 
all the key hierarchy, it can calculate its own Q-MIC and 
compares with the one came from the Supplicant. If they 
match, the Supplicant is authenticated.  
 Recent research work explores some of the flaws of 4-way 
handshake [5, 6, 8, 16]. It was shown that the message 1 of 4-
way handshake is subject to DoS attacks.  Intruders can flood 
message 1 to the supplicant after the 4-way handshake has 
completed, causing the system to fail. Since key distribution of 
our protocol is done by the QKD, use of nonce values in the 
message flows are not required. 
Present hardware devices for quantum transmission require 
Line of Sight (LOS) between the Supplicant and the 
Authenticator in order to transfer photons. However, there has 
been lot of new advancements happening in this area to 
eliminate the requirement of LOS for quantum transmission. 
One such research work is done by Kedar and Arnon [9] to 
have Non Line Of Sight (NLOS) system for optical 
communication by using wireless sensor network. 
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of this set up can be divided into two 
main communication phases: Quantum Communication and 
Wireless Communication. The quantum communication is only 
used for a short time to transmit the quantum key in the form of 
series of polarized photons. This transmission is fully 
controlled by hardware devices such as photon transmitter and 
the detector at either ends.  
Our implementation is twofold: Setting up the quantum 
channel, implementing the wireless communication. The 
implementation is currently happening in both streams 
(hardware and software) in parallel. University of Canberra has 
past research activities on QKD [15].  During that project, a 
QKD system was successfully established between university 
of Canberra and Telstra tower. We choose this hardware setup 
as our quantum transmission between the Supplicant and 
Authenticator.  We plan to have this hardware set up for a short 
distance to suit for Wi-Fi networks. We would like to 
emphasize that we do not pay much attention in converting the 
present bulky quantum hardware to fit in comparatively small 
Wi-Fi apparatus. There are lots of new developments taking 
place to include quantum devices in small gadgets [28].  Our 
aim in this research is to demonstrate a working QKD based 
key distribution process for Wi-Fi using the proposed protocol. 
For simplicity, we use both Authenticator and Authentication 
Server as one entity. The high level view of this test set up is 
shown in Figure 4. 
The Supplicant is running on Windows XP, while the 
Authenticator/Authentication Server machine is running on 
Windows Server 2000. We have chosen Microsoft “Native 
WiFi” product with its user Application Programming 
Interfaces (API) to be used for software developments. 
We start from the place where the 802.1X process deliver 
the PMK to the Authenticator and the Supplicant. At this stage 
both parties switch to hardware channel to start the photon 
transmission. Once the photon transmission finishes, they 
switch back to wireless channel. Both Supplicant and 
Authenticator store the states of the photons that they used 




Figure 4: Test set up of QKD based key distribution for Wi-Fi 
 In the next message, Supplicant sends the bases it used to 
polarize the photons. Upon receiving the bases, the 
Authenticator extracts the bits based on the information it has. 
(We recall that describing the operation of SARG04 is not in 
scope of this paper). During this stage, the two parties estimate 
the error introduce during the transmission.  This error could 
result due to atmospheric noise [23], dark counts in the photon 
detectors, eavesdropping etc. To estimate this error level, the 
Supplicant chooses a sample from its key and reveals to the 
Authenticator. This message frame consist of the start bit 
position and the length of the sample. The authenticator 
compares the bits it extracted and if it is below the threshold 
level, the Authenticator informs Supplicant with Success 
message to proceed with. Otherwise it sends out Fail message 
asking the Supplicant to reattempt the Photon transmission. 
The threshold value for error estimation has been set as a 
configurable parameter at the Authenticator. 
Unlike in normal QKD systems, the key used is Wi-Fi is 
not very long. The maximum length of the key that will be 
transmitted via quantum link is 256 for CCMP and 384 for 
TKIP. Therefore the whole key of SARG04 can easily be 
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accommodated into these message flows. Due to this reason, 
the key exchange does not require any indexing to maintain 
long keys spanning across multiple files.  In our set up, all key 
manipulations, comparisons etc are done in memory enabling 
faster operation. 
Figure 5 shows the software architecture of main modules 
of protocol implementation. We use Windows XP (SP2) for 
Authenticator while Windows Server 2000 for 
Authenticator/Authentication Server. The reason to choose 
these OS platforms is due to basic requirements by “Native 
WiFi” product. The software applications running on both 
machines interact with 3 main wrappers classes: Native WiFi, 
Quantum Transmission and SARG04.  
IEEE 802.11 standard defines Medium Access Control 
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications for Wireless 
LANs (IEEE Std 802.11, 2007). Since the changes we made 
under the new QKD protocol are directly on the Physical and 
MAC layers, it is really difficult to rewrite those layers from 
scratch to reflect the changes within the research time frame. 
Therefore, the best possible way of experimenting the new 
protocol is by simulation. Thus, most of the QKD processing 
has been coded using C++ language. For simulation, we have 
chosen Simulink as it provides S-Functions to incorporate C++ 
programs into Simulink. 
 
 
Figure 5: Software Communication Architecture 
 
 Authenticator and Supplicant state machine procedures 
that used to implement QKD in IEEE 802.11 standard are 
described below.  
 
Authenticator State machine procedures 
The procedure that used to receive photons: 
ReceivePhotons() 
PMK = TRUE 
// Receive photons 
qcTransmissions++ 
if (QCFinished and qcTransmissions) 
<= qcTransmissionsThreshold  
then 
      basesRecorded = TRUE 
else if QCTimeOutEvt  
then 
      EAPOL(reattemptTransmission) 
else 
      QCError // unable to setup 
 // quantum transmission 
end if 
    The procedure that used for reconciliation:  
reconciliationAuthenticator() 
if (QKD Phase = 0000 0101) then 
if ReconciliationCounter == 0    then   
        1 Divide the raw key  
  into blocks                                        
        2 Calculate parity of  
  each block 
    else if (ReconciliationCounter == MaxSubLevel) or (no 
more parity mismatches)   
 then  
      end of reconciliation 
      else  
   //A new EAPOL reconciliation 
   //frame has received 
     1 compare the parities received 
    against corresponding block(s) 
     2 discard the last bit of the  
      blocks compared 
     3 identify blocks sub-blocks 
    with parity differences 
     4 bisect the blocks with 
     parity differences 
     5 Calculate sub-block parity 
     6 Set Sub-Block Level field 
     7 ReconciliationCounter + 1 
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      end if 
   end if 
end if  
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Wireless networks are subject to various security risks. 
Most significant source of risk in wireless networks is that the 
technology’s underlying communication medium, the airwave, 
is open to intruders. Due to this reason, lots of efforts have 
been put in to address security issues in wireless networks. To 
address the same issue, we figure out the usage of quantum 
cryptography for key distribution in 802.11 networks. The 
advantage of quantum cryptography over traditional key 
exchange methods is that the exchange of information can be 
shown to be secure in a very strong sense, without making 
assumptions about the intractability of certain mathematical 
problems. In our work, we take advantage of the 
“unconditional security” offered by QKD to merge with IEEE 
802.11i wireless network. For small wireless networks such as 
IEEE 802.11, quantum cryptography can serve better to 
provide secure data communications. With the recent 
advancements on MIMO technology for quantum 
transmissions, shows us a better way towards eliminating the 
LOS restriction.  Although present technology does not extend 
to provide quantum transmissions in 802.11 apparatus so far, 
we believe our work will contribute to develop secure 
communications for future wireless networks. 
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